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IN RE MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. RESEARCH REPORTS
SECURITIES LITIGATION
(decided August 12, 2003)
PATRICK G. DIAMOND*
In the world of gambling, the house always wins.  The recent
decision handed down by Judge Milton Pollack of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Securities Litigation1 illustrates the
increasingly difficult landscape facing today’s plaintiff classes in se-
curities fraud class action lawsuits.  The court’s description of the
marketplace as a “freewheeling casino”2 serves as a warning sign
that the cards are stacked against plaintiffs who turn towards litiga-
tion to recover monetary losses from the securities markets in the
aftermath of the burst of the internet or dot.com bubble.  The
court reminds plaintiffs that the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)3 sets strict pleading requirements that
must be met if a claim is to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4  This Com-
ment focuses on the court’s discussion of loss causation in securities
fraud lawsuits;5 specifically criticizing the court’s holding that an
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2006.
1. 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter In re Merrill Lynch].
2. Id. at 358.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995). See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for
Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009 (1996) (stating that the
PSLRA made additions to the Securities Act of 1934 and is the first comprehensive
revision of the federal securities laws governing private securities litigation since their
enactment as part of the New Deal).
4. FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6) is a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5. See generally Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d
87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “loss causation [is similar] to the tort concept of
proximate cause, meaning that in order for the plaintiff to recover it must prove the
damages it suffered were a foreseeable consequence of the misrepresentation.”). See
also David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach To Loss Causation Under Rule 10B-5 In Light of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781
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628 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
intervening cause, such as the burst of the dot.com bubble, can
break the causal nexus between a defendant’s wrongdoing and a
plaintiff’s injury.  A potential impact of the court’s holding is a limi-
tation of plaintiff’s statutory rights by creating an inability to suc-
cessfully plead loss causation when plaintiff’s monetary losses
coincide with a marketwide phenomenon.
In June of 2001, the New York Attorney General’s Office began
an investigation into stock recommendations issued by research
analysts6 across the securities industry, and took an in depth look at
recommendations made by the internet research analysts at Merrill
Lynch and other financial institutions.7  The investigation led to
several findings including that:
[s]ince late 1999, the internet research analysts at Merrill
Lynch had published ratings for internet stocks that were
misleading because: (1) the ratings in many cases did not
reflect the analysts’ true opinions of the companies; (2) as
a matter of undisclosed, internal policy, no “reduce” or
“sell” recommendations were issued, thereby converting a
published five-point rating scale into a de facto three
point system; and (3) Merrill Lynch failed to disclose to
the public that Merrill Lynch’s ratings were tarnished by
an undisclosed conflict of interest: the research analysts
were acting as quasi-investment bankers8 for the compa-
nies at issue, often initiating, continuing, and/or manipu-
lating research coverage for the purpose of attracting and
keeping investment banking clients, thereby producing
6. A research analyst is a financial professional who has expertise in evaluating
investments.  He/she typically employed by brokerage firms, investment advisors, or
mutual funds.  Analysts put together buy, sell, and hold recommendations on securities.
Analysts usually specialize in specific industries or sectors to allow for comprehensive
research, (definition available at http://investopedia.com/terms/a/analyst.asp.
7. Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in the matter of An Inquiry by Eliot Spitzer, Attor-
ney General of the State of New York, with regard to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. at 2
(April, 2002) [hereinafter Dinallo Affidavit].  “The Dinallo affidavit was offered in sup-
port of an application before the New York state courts for an order, pursuant to New
York state law, requiring Merrill Lynch employees to turn over documents and give
testimony in the Attorney General’s continuing investigation.” In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F.
Supp. 2d at 357 (2003).
8. An investment banker is a person representing a financial institution that is in
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misleading ratings that were neither objective nor
independent, as they purported to be.9
These findings were made public in April of 2002 in an affidavit
filed by the Attorney General’s Office in New York State Supreme
Court.10
Plaintiffs, who were investors in two of the many internet com-
panies that Merrill Lynch’s research analysts covered — 24/7 Real
Media (“24/7”) and Interliant,11 brought a class action suit “[alleg-
ing] that the analyst opinions expressed in the research reports
were materially misleading and violated Section 10(b)12 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10(b)(5)13 promulgated
9. Dinallo Affidavit at 3. (the Attorney General’s Investigation led to a $1.4 bil-
lion settlement with numerous securities firms due to discovered conflict of interests
discovered and tainted research reports that were made public.)  Press Release, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (April 28,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
10. See generally Dinallo Affidavit.
11. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359. “The 24/7 and Interliant cases were
only two out of approximately 27 consolidated actions” assigned to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York by the Multidistrict Panel for con-
solidated administration.  “Each of the actions consolidates cases pertaining to a single
issuing company (internet stock) or investment fund.  The 25 actions that are not the
subject of the instant motion [were] stayed pending resolution of the legal issues raised
in the 24/7 and Interliant motions.” Id. at 359 n. 14.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).  Rule 10(b) states: “It shall be unlawful for any per-
son, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”  For an allegation under SEC Rule 10b-5 to be sustained, a
plaintiff must show that “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the de-
fendant, acting with scienter, made a false material misrepresentation or omitted to
disclose material information and that plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused
plaintiff’s injury.  Suez Equity Investors, L.P., v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87,
95 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir.
1999)).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).  Rule 10(b)(5) states: It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
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thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”14  Plain-
tiffs filed suit soon after the affidavit of the New York Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office was made public, and they relied heavily on the
affidavit for support of their allegations.15  Defendant Merrill Lynch
moved to dismiss the class action complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and for failure to plead fraud with particularity, “as required
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”16  The court granted
defendant’s motion stating that “[p]laintiffs have failed to ade-
quately plead that defendant and its former chief internet analyst
caused their losses.  The facts and circumstances . . . show . . . that
plaintiffs brought their own losses upon themselves when they
knowingly spun an extremely high-risk, high-stakes wheel of for-
tune.”17 (emphasis in the original).
To bring a successful claim under the federal securities laws, in
addition to proving, inter alia,  intent to make a false material mis-
representation or omission of fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security,18 a plaintiff must satisfy the two-prong pleading
requirement of causation: transaction causation,19 “i.e., but for the
fraudulent statement or omission, the plaintiff would not have en-
tered into the transaction,”20 and loss causation,21 “i.e., the subject
of the fraudulent statement or omission was the cause of the actual
loss suffered.”22
None of the plaintiffs in In re Merrill Lynch alleged to have read
the analyst reports themselves, nor were they customers of Merrill
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
14. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 355.
17. Id. at 358.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
19. Transaction causation is based upon the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defen-
dant’s deceptive statements or omissions; that is, but for such conduct by the defen-
dant, the plaintiff would not have acted to his detriment.  Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. Id. at 95.
21. Id. at 96.
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Lynch.23  To get around this fact, plaintiffs alleged reliance through
the fraud-on-the-market theory, which hypothesizes that “in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a stock is deter-
mined by the available material information. . .misleading state-
ments will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.”24  Under this
theory, investors rely upon the integrity of the market price and all
the information that the market price represents.  Once a securities
transaction is entered into, reliance on the market price is pre-
sumed to be reliance on any and all information, including any mis-
statements.  As such, plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the first prong of
causation – transaction causation.
Plaintiffs, however, did not sufficiently plead the second prong
of causation – loss causation.25  The loss causation provision states:
In any private action arising under this title, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission
of the defendant alleged to violate this title caused the
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.26
The court utilized its own tri-partite analysis to illustrate the insuffi-
ciency of plaintiff’s allegations.  Part one addressed that “alleging
‘artificial inflation’ is not sufficient to satisfy loss causation.”27
Plaintiffs argued that Wall Street’s investment bankers and research
analysts were responsible for inflating stock prices through a “clas-
sic stock market manipulation” scheme based upon the overly opti-
mistic ratings and the omission that conflicts of interests existed,
23. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
24. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988). See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Cre-
ated the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 367 (1995) (stating that fraud-on-the-market theory “assumes
that in an efficient market, the market has imputed into the stack price all publicly
available material information. Because of this phenomenon, courts presume reliance
of the plaintiff on the market price.”).
25. Loss causation was “developed exclusively out of case law and was never ex-
pressly recognized by the Supreme Court,” however, Congress codified loss causation
when it enacted the PSLRA in 1995 and made it applicable to all securities fraud suits.
In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362 citing David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning
Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2000).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 128 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR311.txt unknown Seq: 6 16-APR-04 15:13
632 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
and it was this scheme that created the internet bubble.28  The
court noted, however, that “[e]ven if there was a claim that the mis-
conduct caused the purchase price of the stocks to be artificially
inflated, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts (as opposed to legal
conclusions) from which to infer that the alleged omissions were a
substantial cause of any inflation.”29  The court also noted that
“[t]here is no factual predicate or legitimate inference from facts
alleged. . .for plaintiffs’ semantic invention of a stock market ma-
nipulation for internet company securities.”30
The court’s second stage of analysis focused on the inapplica-
bility of the “fraud on the market theory” to loss causation.31  As
noted earlier, “fraud on the market theory” is a device that allows
plaintiffs to satisfy the reliance aspect of transaction causation.32
However, Second Circuit cases have split on whether to allow plain-
tiffs to utilize this theory to satisfy both transaction causation and
loss causation.33  Here, the court stated that “[t]o permit plaintiffs
to allege artificial inflation through the fraud on the market theory
to satisfy loss causation would improperly conflate both the ‘but for’
transaction causation and the loss causation elements into one.”34
The court cites to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Robbins v. Kroger
Props, Inc.35 for support on this particular point.  In Robbins, the
court held that plaintiffs, despite successfully showing that defen-
dant’s actions caused the price of the stock in question to be artifi-
cially inflated, needed more to satisfy loss causation.36
The third stage analyzed the burst of the internet bubble as an
intervening cause that serves to negate any casual link between the
defendant’s misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s damages.  The
28. Id. at 362.
29. Id. at 363.
30. Id. at 362.
31. Id. at 365.
32. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
33. See Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189
(2d Cir. 2003) (stating that purchase-time disparity can not satisfy loss causation). Cf.
In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp.2d 281, and Demarco v. Robertson
Stephens, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 590 (GEL), 2004 WL 51232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding
that fraud-on-the-market theory can satisfy both transaction causation and loss
causation).
34. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
35. 116 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1997).
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court reasoned that the alleged omissions were not the proximate
or legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages but rather a marketwide
phenomenon.37  The court states that “[t]here was no casual con-
nection between the burst of the bubble and the alleged omissions;
it was the burst which caused the market drop and the resultant
losses a considerable time thereafter when plaintiffs decided it was
time to sell.”38 The court held that “when the plaintiff’s loss coin-
cides with a marketwide phenomenon causing comparable losses to
other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by
the fraud decreases.”39
In re Merrill Lynch is a clear example of the often stringent
pleading requirements of  10(b)(5) claims within the Second Cir-
cuit.  The court, in order to avoid having the federal securities laws
twisted into “a scheme of cost-free speculators’ insurance”40 where
plaintiffs can seek to “lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bub-
ble solely at the feet of a single actor, Merrill Lynch,”41 requires
specificity and particularity in alleging securities fraud.  Conclusory
allegations with no factual basis will be dismissed with prejudice.
The court’s analysis of loss causation suggests that a plaintiff
who utilizes a fraud on the market theory – such as those in In re
Merrill Lynch – must be able to plead, and eventually prove, two
things: (1) that the alleged misrepresentations and omissions
caused a stock price to be artificially inflated at the time of
purchase; and (2) that the defendant’s misrepresentations and/or
omissions also caused the stock price to decline.  But, even if a
plaintiff pleads both elements sufficiently, his claim(s) may still be
dismissed if an intervening cause negates the causal link between
the misrepresentations and/or omissions and plaintiff’s damages.42
It is this idea of an intervening cause which future courts should
consider, for it allows defendants to hide behind a shield of judi-
37. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
38. Id.
39. Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d. 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994) cited
in In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
40. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
41. Id.
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cially made law affording them added protection not envisioned by
the PSLRA.43
The third stage of the courts tri-partite analysis of loss causa-
tion, as described above, focuses on the burst of the internet bubble
and the resulting precipitous decline in stock market prices as the
actual cause of plaintiff’s damages.44  It is perfectly logical that a
defendant should not be responsible for a drop in stock prices
when extraneous factors caused the actual loss.45  However, by us-
ing an extremely complex marketwide phenomenon such as the
bursting of a stock bubble46 as an intervening cause, the court is
essentially non-suiting plaintiffs in securities fraud cases that follow
a market crash or bubble.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Robbins v. Kroger Props, Inc.47 addressed this very notion by stating
that “because market responses, such as market downturns, are
often the result of many different, complex, and often unknowable
factors, ‘the plaintiff need not show that the defendant’s act was the
sole and exclusive cause of the injury he has suffered; he need only
show that it was ‘substantial, i.e., a significant contributing
43. See David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach To Loss Causation Under Rule 10B-5
In Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1781, 1810-14 (2000) (describing the legislative history surrounding the enact-
ment of the PSLRA.  The author notes that the primary forces behind the legislation
were accounting firms and related lobbyists who hoped to stem the tide of frivolous
class action law suits brought by plaintiffs in order to extract lucrative settlements.  Con-
gress, however, did not wish to discourage the filing of meritorious claims).
44. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
45. See Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1441 (holding that the defendant company’s stock
price dropped when the investing public was made aware that there would be a de-
crease in the company’s dividend due to a lack of income generation from real estate
assets, not from accounting irregularities coming to light).
46. See LAWRENCE LEE EVANS, JR., WHY THE BUBBLE BURST: U.S. STOCK MARKET PER-
FORMANCE SINCE 1982, 208-10 (Malcolm C. Sawyer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Lim-
ited 2003) (2003) (the author notes that a supply and demand theory explains the run-
up of the stock market with numerous contributing factors including: “irrational exu-
berance” on the part of investors, corporate fundamentals, e.g., future dividend pay-
ments, foreign capital and mutual fund flows, as well as equity retirements from the
secondary markets.  Factors leading to the burst of the market bubble included: inves-
tor’s inability to believe disproportionate company valuations, corporation’s inability to
retire more equity, slowdown in foreign and mutual fund flows, and disclosure of ac-
counting irregularities leading to significant earnings restatements).





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 130 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR311.txt unknown Seq: 9 16-APR-04 15:13
2004] IN RE MERRILL LYNCH & CO. 635
cause.’”48  In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group,
Inc.,49 explicitly stated that “if the loss was caused by an intervening
event, like a general fall in price of Internet stocks, the chain of
causation will not have been established.  But such is a matter of
proof at trial and not to be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.”50 (emphasis in original).
How are plaintiffs expected to prove what is and what is not a
“substantial” cause when numerous factors are at play in a stock
market bubble?  And isn’t the judiciary usurping the role of the
legislature by adding yet another hurdle for plaintiffs to cope with
in addition to the already difficult pleading requirements set forth
by the PSLRA?
The In re Merrill Lynch court, distinguished plaintiffs with those
in In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation,51 stating that the
WorldCom “plaintiffs alleged that the research reports were materi-
ally false and misleading because the analyst had failed to disclose
material nonpublic information he possessed about the company
and had purportedly concealed the company’s true financial condi-
tion . . .”52  This, presumably, would satisfy the “substantial” test laid
out in Robbins.  In In re Merrill Lynch, however, the underlying mate-
rial supporting the research reports published by Merrill Lynch
were not false or misleading, nor did the analysts try to conceal any
of the corporation’s financial data.53  Should this fact alone be
enough to distinguish these cases?  After all, the Merrill Lynch re-
ports publicly recommended that investors accumulate 24/7 stock,
despite being described as a “piece of s__” within Merrill Lynch.54
By applying the Robbins “substantial test,” the In re Merrill Lynch
plaintiffs would have to prove that the misrepresentations caused
the decline in stock price in a substantial way.  It is unclear what
role, if any, the revelation of the true opinions of the analysts
48. Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447 (quoting Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1531
(11th Cir. 1989)).
49. 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 197.
51. 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
52. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 364 n.25.
53. Id. at 360.
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played in the bursting of the internet bubble, but it is clear that
isolating this factor from the countless other factors that contrib-
uted to the burst is a difficult task.
“[E]vidence suggests that investors are justified in pointing a
collective finger at US corporations and the security industry [be-
cause] investors prone to speculative enthusiasms are unduly sus-
ceptible to misrepresentations, corporate fraud, and new economy
concepts lacking true economic substance.”55  The dismissal in In re
Merrill Lynch is a strong indication as to how the remaining cases,
based on similar allegations, pending before the court will fair56
and illustrates, once again, that the house wins.57
55. LAWRENCE LEE EVANS, JR., WHY THE BUBBLE BURST: U.S. STOCK MARKET PER-
FORMANCE SINCE 1982, 2 (Malcolm C. Sawyer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2003)
(2003).
56. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359 n. 14.
57. Plaintiffs have filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit on September 12, 2003.
